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Abstract 
We use data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections to examine the response of voters to candidates 
who have reported that they have criminal charges against them. Our empirical results show that 
voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges, but the magnitude of the penalty decreases 
if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges.  The vote shares are 
positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates 
with criminal charges.  Moreover, candidates with criminal charged also have greater wealth.   
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1. Introduction 
 
It is now well-known that the nexus between Indian politicians and criminals has assumed 
alarming proportions. Roughly a fourth of the members of the current Lok Sabha (the lower 
house of the national parliament) face pending criminal charges.
2
 A similar situation prevails in 
the various state assemblies.  Many of the members of the national parliament or state assemblies 
have been indicted with serious charges, including murder and rape. Not surprisingly, this has 
attracted increasing attention in both the media as well as in academic research.  
The only legal measure designed to prevent the influx of criminals into parliament and the 
state assemblies is the Representation of People’s Act, 1951. This Act specifies that candidates 
will be barred from contesting an election on conviction by a court of Law. The period of 
disqualification is for six years from the date of conviction, or from the date of release from 
prison, depending on the severity of the charge. Unfortunately, this law hardly has any bite 
because of the well-known infirmities in the Indian judicial system. Even when cases are 
registered, inordinate judicial delay implies that these cases drag on, seemingly indefinitely. And 
there is also the possibility that governments typically drag their feet when it comes to 
prosecuting “local elites”.  
This is why the Election Commission had proposed in 2004 that the Representation of the 
People Act should be amended to disqualify candidates accused of offences which carry 
sentences of five years or more as soon as a court deems that charges can be framed against the 
person. However, the Lok Sabha itself would  have to pass appropriate legislation to implement 
the Election Commission’s suggestion. Obviously, such legislation is against the interests of a 
large number of politicians, and so it is not surprising that the Election Commission’s proposal 
has not been implemented. 
A landmark judgement of the Supreme Court in 2002 required every candidate contesting 
state and national elections to submit a legal affidavit disclosing his or her educational 
qualifications, as well as information about personal wealth,  and most importantly their criminal 
record. The court also stipulated that wide publicity should be given to the contents of the 
affidavits so that the electorate can take informed decisions about who to elect to the assemblies 
                                                          
2
 That is, courts have decided that these charges have sufficient credibility for judicial proceedings to be initiated. 
However, this does not mean that these charges have culminated in convictions. 
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and parliaments. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s order does not seem to have had much 
impact in so far as the influx of legislators with criminal indictment is concerned.
3
 
The continuing entry of large numbers of candidates with criminal records into Indian 
legislatures raises at least a couple of intriguing questions. First, why do parties nominate such 
candidates? Given the huge demand for party tickets, the nomination of candidates with criminal 
records suggests that such candidates must possess some electoral advantage. We discuss some 
hypotheses which have been suggested to explain this electoral advantage.  Second, what is the 
response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have criminal charges against them?    
While the first  issue has been discussed in the literature, the second issue has not been 
scrutinized rigorously. A somewhat cursory look at the data by simply looking at the ratio of 
winning candidates to number of contesting candidates amongst the criminal and non-criminal 
groups suggests that criminal candidates have a higher probability of winning. Perhaps, this has 
given rise to the feeling that criminals have an electoral advantage. The following from Aidt et al 
(2011) is representative of the prevailing view:  “Criminals, we show, boast an extraordinary 
electoral advantage in India.”  
We analyze this phenomenon of electoral advantage of criminals in India using the data on 
candidates for the 2009 general elections in India.  We use a simple analytical model  used in   
Dutta and Gupta(2012).  This model  assumes that criminal charges do give rise to some stigma amongst the 
electorate.  This stigma has a negative effect on vote shares since voters are less likely to vote for candidates who 
have criminal charges levied against them. However, the negative effect of this stigma on a candidate’s vote share  is 
lower if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges.  Campaigning, the cost of which is 
borne from candidates’ wealth, helps a candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the 
“marginal” voter.  A criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince 
voters of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal charges. This is 
plausible since the candidates have not been convicted, but only charged with some criminal offence. We look at a 
Nash equilibrium of a game in which the only strategic variable is the amount of campaign expenditure. Our 
regression model described later is derived from the predictions of the theoretical model. 
A principal finding is that voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges. That is, all 
else being equal, the vote share of a candidate with criminal charges is lower than that of ones 
who do not have any such blemish. Notice that the negative effect of criminal charges on vote 
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and Vivekananda (2004), Vaishnav  (2011). 
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shares seems to contradict the prevalent view that candidates with criminal charges – or tainted 
candidates as we will henceforth call them - have an electoral advantage.  However, these tainted 
candidates are able to overcome this electoral disadvantage because they have greater wealth, 
and wealth plays a significant role in increasing vote shares.   The most plausible channel 
through which wealth affects vote shares is of course through campaign expenditures, which are 
likely to be positively related to wealth.  The negative effect is also reduced if there are other 
candidates in the constituency with criminal charges. 
Since voters penalise candidates with criminal charges, why do political parties still 
nominate them when so many candidates without criminal charges fight to get their party’s 
nomination?  A plausible explanation starts from the premise that candidates facing the threat of 
criminal convictions are more keen to contest the elections. Their enthusiasm is easily explained. 
Apart from the usual benefits which accrue to all successful candidates, candidates with criminal 
indictments look forward to an additional benefit. In particular, successful candidates 
(particularly those belonging to parties in the government) can with high probability either use 
coercion or influence to ensure that the local administration does not pursue the case(s) against 
them with any vigour.  
Moreover, the data suggest that criminal candidates are significantly wealthier than those 
without criminal charges.
4
 Also, they are perhaps willing to contribute a higher fraction of their 
wealth to the party, or they ask for less resources from the party. This simply reflects the higher 
price or value that they place on a party ticket. So, criminal candidates generate positive 
externalities to candidates of their own party since their additional contributions release party 
funds which can be used in  other constituencies. This is a plausible explanation of why parties 
may nominate candidates with criminal backgrounds even if they are (partially) penalised at the 
polls. 
Several recent papers offer explanations of why parties choose candidates with a dubious 
background. Banerjee and Pande (2009) start with the observation that voters may have a 
preference for candidates belonging to their own ethnic group. This implies that a politician 
belonging to the ethnically dominant group in a constituency may win even if he is of lower 
quality. Banerjee and Pande (2009) assume that parties do want to select candidates of the best 
quality. However, the quality of candidates available to a party in any constituency is a random 
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variable. They show that an increase in the relative size of the ethnically dominant group or an 
increase in voters’ preferences for candidates belonging to their own group can worsen the 
quality of the winning candidate. Banerjee and Pande test the predictions of their model by using 
panel data on politician quality in 102 jurisdictions in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
5
  
Of course, the Banerjee-Pande hypothesis does not explain why so many candidates with a 
criminal background contest elections. But, it does provide at least a partial explanation of why 
there is an increasing number of successful legislators in state assemblies as well as the Lok 
Sabha with criminal background.  
Vaishnav (2011) studies elections to 28 state assemblies between 2003 and 2009. He finds 
that personal wealth of candidates is positively associated with criminal status where a candidate 
is defined to be a criminal if he has been charged with a “serious” crime. The basic result is 
subjected to a variety of robustness checks. This leads him to offer the same explanation that we 
have mentioned earlier- parties nominate criminal candidates simply because they contribute 
larger sums to the party coffers.   
Aidt. et al (2011) develop  an interesting  theoretical model where they assume that 
criminal candidates have some electoral advantage, although parties also incur some reputational 
cost in nominating them. They “are agnostic about the sources of this advantage”, but speculate 
that the electoral advantage of criminals could arise because they can intimidate prospective 
voters of rival parties into staying away from the polls. Notice that this would imply voting 
turnout should be negatively correlated with number of criminals in a constituency. We show 
that this is not true in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.  
So, parties face a trade-off between the reputational cost of nominating candidates with 
criminal charges and their electoral advantage. This trade-off implies that parties would be more 
willing to incur the reputational cost in constituencies which are likely to witness close contests 
since the electoral advantage is more attractive in these constituencies. Conversely, a party 
would be unlikely to field a tainted candidate in a constituency where the party is very likely to 
win. Similarly, candidates with criminal indictments are more likely to be fielded in 
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constituencies where the cost is lower – for instance, in constituencies where voters are poorly 
informed about the characteristics of the contesting candidates.
6
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The econometric specification and the details 
on the data and the different data sources used in the paper are described in section 2. Results 
from the empirical exercise are discussed in section 3, and the last section concludes.   
2. Data and Econometric Specification 
   We now describe the data and the econometric specification used in the empirical exercise. 
Data 
In 2002,  the Supreme Court in India decreed that all candidates contesting an election for 
the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, or state assemblies in India had to file an affidavit with the Election 
Commission of India containing information on their assets (and liabilities), criminal charges and 
education.  We derive the data on these variables directly from the affidavits of the candidates- 
these are available on the election commission’s website as well as from a website maintained by 
the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), http://myneta.info.  
The data on percent of votes obtained, age, and gender of the candidates are obtained from 
the election commission’s website. Information on candidate incumbency has been gathered 
using various sources including searching through reports in the newspapers or on various 
internet sites. We define a party as an incumbent in a State if it was in power in the State (or was 
a major coalition partner), from 2008 up to the elections in 2009. The State level incumbency 
information has been put together using the information contained in various articles in the 
Economic and Political Weekly and elsewhere.   Appendix A1 provides the data sources from 
where the data on various variables have been obtained, while Appendix A2 provides the 
summary statistics of the variables. 
India has 28 States and 7 Union Territories (UTs) in all. Among the UTs, only Delhi has its 
proper local administration with its own Chief Minister, while the remaining UTs are 
administered by the centre. Therefore, we include Delhi as a “State” in our sample while 
excluding the remaining six UTs from the analysis. We follow Gupta and Panagariya (2012) and 
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exclude the eight northeastern States since they have a special status with deep involvement of 
the center in their development process, as well as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This leaves 
us with a total of 20 States including Delhi. These States account for 506 out of the total of 543 
parliamentary seats across the country.  
Using the data from the affidavits, we define three categories for the education status of the 
candidates : education up to high school, upto  undergraduate level,  or with a   post graduate or   
technical degree, and define different dummies for each one of them. Relative wealth is 
calculated as the ratio of the wealth of the candidate to the average wealth of the rest of the 
candidates in the constituency. In the regressions where we  exclude all Independent candidates,  
relative wealth of candidate i is defined as  the ratio of the candidate’s wealth to the average 
wealth of the other non-Independent candidates in the constituency. 
Each candidate’s affidavit has to contain information on whether the candidate faced any 
criminal charges, as well as the sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) under which the charges 
if any have been framed. In addition, the candidate has to declare whether he or she has ever 
been convicted. Thus, in principle, data are available on the number of criminal cases that a 
candidate faces, the specific sections of the IPC under which the candidate faces these charges 
and whether the candidate has ever been convicted. The ADR further divides the charges into the 
charges for serious and non serious offences, by examining the sections of the IPC under which 
the candidates face the charges.  The conviction rate of candidates facing charges is very low, out 
of the 1,155 candidates in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections who faced at least one criminal charge, 
only 15 candidates were convicted. 
It is sometimes claimed that the data on criminal charges is misleading since the charges 
might be initiated by political rivals. Moreover, some of the charges are associated with 
involvement in political activities. In order to clean the data of such “spurious” charges, we 
specify a value of one to the criminal dummy only when a candidate faces more than one charge.  
This adjustment takes care of some obvious cases of frivolous charges or charges arising out of 
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political activities.
7
 Henceforth, we will use the term tainted candidate to denote a candidate who 
has two or more criminal charges against them. 
Consider now the patterns of criminal charges across candidates, states, and parties, and 
their correlates with other candidate specific factors for the 20 states that are included in our 
regression analysis. Table 1 shows that it is the national and recognized state parties which field 
a substantially higher proportion of tainted candidates. In fact, roughly one in seven candidates 
fielded by state parties have at least two criminal charges levied against them.  The 
corresponding number for national parties is over one in ten candidates. This, together with the 
fact that a substantially higher number of winning candidates come from the national and state 
parties, is a partial explanation of why the win-ratio (the ratio of the number of successful 
candidates to the number of contesting candidates) is substantially higher for tainted candidates. 
This is documented in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of constituencies by the number of candidates who faced at 
least two charges. On average, about 15 candidates contested the election in each constituency in 
the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Despite the large number of candidates, an overwhelming number 
of constituencies - over 75 per cent – had no tainted candidates.  In other words, there was a 
concentration of tainted candidates in some constituencies. In fact, states like Bihar, Jharkhand, 
and Kerala had a concentration of tainted candidates. 
Table 4 shows that on average, tainted candidates were wealthier, more likely to be 
incumbents and obtained a much larger percent of the votes. Somewhat surprisingly, the average 
age and education level of tainted candidates is also higher. Indeed, the differences in averages 
of these variables for tainted and other candidates are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.   
Econometric Specification 
Our main interest is in examining whether the higher win ratio of tainted candidates can be 
reconciled with the  assumption that voters do punish these candidates.  The dependent variable 
in all our regressions is the vote share of each candidate i.  Since this takes value between zero 
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and one, we transform the variable by calculating the log odds ratio for vote share of each 
candidate and estimate the model by ordinary least squares, with heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors. The dependent variable    is thus calculated as    (
           
             
)     
Another constraint that the data imposes is that the vote shares of all candidates add up to 
one within each constituency.  Therefore, in our benchmark regressions, we estimate the 
regressions either by dropping all the candidates of a large party
8
, or all the candidates belonging 
to a large coalition such as the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) or National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA), one at a time. Since the vote shares of these large parties and coalitions are 
significant (see Table 5), the adding-up constraint does not apply any longer. 
We first start with a parsimonious specification in which the only explanatory variables are 
the criminal dummy and Relative Wealth.  The reason why Relative (and not Absolute) wealth is 
used is straightforward.  While the wealth of candidate i himself should have a positive impact, 
the wealth of other candidates should have a non-positive effect since vote shares add up to one. 
It therefore makes sense to use the relative wealth of candidate i as an explanatory variable.  We 
also include other candidate characteristics such as the level of education of the candidate, 
dummy for the incumbent candidates seeking reelection to Lok Sabha, and a dummy for the 
candidates contesting as members of the state incumbent party(ies) in the regression equation.   
The variables of particular interest are the criminal dummy and relative wealth. Tables 6 
and 7 report the results of the regression exercises. The difference between these two tables is 
that the latter excludes the set of all Independent candidates from the sample. However, there is 
no difference in the qualitative results. It turns out that the coefficients of both these variables are 
positive and statistically significant.  Of course, the fact that the coefficient on the criminal 
dummy variable is positive seems to corroborate the view that tainted candidates have an 
electoral advantage. Certainly, it does not suggest that voters attach any stigma to tainted 
candidates. 
Next, we introduce a new variable which is the interaction of the criminal dummy with the 
number of other tainted candidates in the constituency.  The presence of other tainted candidates 
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in the constituency increases the vote share of a tainted candidate – a finding consistent with the 
theoretical model. The coefficient on the criminal dummy continues to be positive but is no 
longer statistically significant. So, these regressions do not suggest that voters punish tainted 
candidates. 
However, the data does suggest that tainted candidates are significantly wealthier than the 
rest. The possibility that wealth may play a differential role for tainted candidates remains open. 
Since the earlier parsimonious regressions do not incorporate these factors explicitly, we enrich 
the specification by introducing a new variable which is the interaction of wealth with the 
criminal dummy.  
So, our benchmark regression equation is: 
Yi=α + βc Criminal dummyi +  βcw Wealthi* Criminal dummyi  +  γs Number of 
Candidates with Chargesi *Criminal dummyi+ βw Relative Wealthi + βn Incumbencyi  + 
βns State Incumbenti  + βe Dummies for high Education Statusi + γ Constituency Fixed 
Effects + λ Party Fixed Effects + εi (11)  
In this formulation, βc measures the response of voters to candidates with a criminal 
charge.  Note that βcw is not quite the marginal effect of wealth on vote shares of the tainted 
candidates since we use relative wealth as the “uninteracted” variable. It measures the 
differential impact of wealth on candidates with criminal charges. 
In all our regressions we include constituency fixed effects and party fixed effects to 
control for omitted variables, such as the varying policy platforms of the candidates belonging to 
different political parties.  We also conduct various robustness tests which are reported in detail 
in the next section.  
Our empirical results for the basic regression equations are discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
3.  Main Regression Results  
In this section, we describe the results of the basic regressions.  We have two parallel sets 
of basic regressions. In the first, we estimate our regressions using the data for all candidates in 
the twenty states that we have included in our analysis. We then run the same regression on a 
11 
 
smaller sample which includes only the candidates affiliated with some political party, thus 
dropping the observations for “Independent” candidates. We drop the Independent candidates 
since the majority of these candidates obtained only negligible vote shares.
9
 Almost all the 
results are invariant with respect to the two samples.   
Table 8 reports the basic regression results. Column I contains the results for our 
benchmark specification. In subsequent columns we drop the candidates affiliated with the 
Indian National Congress (INC), Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), UPA 
and NDA respectively from the sample, in order to avoid the adding up constraint. In Table 9 we 
carry out a similar exercise but after dropping the Independent candidates from the data.  
The variables we are particularly interested in are the criminal dummy variable, relative 
wealth, as well as the interaction of the criminal dummy with wealth and with the number of 
other candidates with criminal charges in the constituency. Table 8 shows our results. The 
negative coefficient on the criminal dummy shows that tainted candidates lose vote share relative 
to the others. Relative wealth has a positive effect on vote shares. The coefficient of (log) wealth 
interacted with the criminal charge dummy is positive, implying that the loss in vote share is 
smaller for a wealthier candidate. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction between the 
number of other tainted candidates with criminal charges and the criminal dummy is positive and 
significant in the regressions for all the candidates. This implies that the stigma attached to being 
a tainted candidate declines if there are other tainted candidates in the constituency. 
Among other results, the high education status of the candidates has a positive effect on 
vote share. We also find that incumbency at the candidate level as well as at the party level in the 
state increases the vote share of the candidates.
10
 Most of these results are robust to the exclusion 
of Independent candidates from the sample. Importantly, the qualitative results hold irrespective 
of which party or coalition is dropped from the sample in order to take care of the adding-up 
constraint. 
We now report on some robustness checks. Since the primary purpose of the paper is to 
throw light on voter response to tainted candidates, we conduct a key robustness test by 
                                                          
9
 There were 3825 independent candidates with an average vote share of about 0.80 percent. Only 10 Independent 
candidates won in the 2009 election. 
10
 Gupta and Panagariya (2011) also come to the same conclusion.  
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constructing the dummy for criminal charges in an alternative way. This dummy takes value 1 if 
the candidate faces at least three criminal charges (instead of two in the earlier specification), and 
zero otherwise. Construction of the dummy in this way reduces the possibility of labeling a 
candidate as tainted if the charges against him are politically motivated or perhaps arising from 
violations of the law while undertaking political activities. The results are qualitatively similar to 
the ones obtained earlier for most of the variables. The coefficients of the criminal dummy and 
the interaction between wealth and criminal dummy are somewhat larger than before, thus 
indicating that the loss of vote share is larger for a candidate who faces three or more charges 
than for the candidates with at least two charges. For such candidates, additional wealth helps in 
reducing the stigma by a larger amount as well.  
Table 10 reports some additional robustness checks. Column III in Table 10 includes the 
interaction of state incumbent and criminal dummy, while column IV includes age and gender of 
the candidate in the regressions. Finally, in the last column we include the number of all 
candidates with criminal charges in a constituency rather than only against the top four 
candidates by vote share, interacted with the dummy for criminal candidates. 
The results show that the coefficients of the main variables of interest—wealth or relative 
wealth, criminal dummy and the interaction of wealth and criminal dummy, retain their 
significance. The only variable which loses significance in some of the specifications is the 
interaction of the number of charges against other candidates with criminal dummy.  
Some other robustness tests are reported in Table 11. In column I, relative wealth is 
calculated as the ratio of the candidate’s own wealth to the sum of the wealth of candidates who 
received at least 3 percent of the total votes. Similarly, the number of candidates with charges 
also includes the data for only these candidates. In column II we estimate the regressions using 
the data only for the constituencies reserved for candidates from the scheduled castes and 
schedule tribes. In the last column we estimate the regressions only for the constituencies which 
are not reserved for the candidates of the schedules or scheduled tribes. Again all our main 
results hold— the criminal dummy has a negative coefficient, wealth or relative wealth has a 
positive coefficient, and the interaction of wealth and criminal dummy has a positive coefficient. 
The coefficient of other candidates with charges is mostly positive, but insignificant in some of 
the specifications.  
13 
 
We have conducted two more robustness tests, but do not report the results. In one, we 
drop one state at a time and estimate our benchmark specification with the rest of the data. All of 
our results hold with minor variations in the coefficients or the significance levels.  This 
robustness test confirms that our results are not driven by any outlier state. Second we estimate 
regressions similar to those in Table 10 by eliminating the Independent candidates from the 
sample. The qualitative results remain unchanged. 
These results seem to leave very little doubt that voters do punish tainted candidates – this 
conclusion remains true irrespective of the specification chosen by us, and also remains true 
when we leave Independents out of the regression exercise. However, this raises the obvious 
question. Why do political parties nominate so many tainted candidates when they have so many 
other aspiring candidates fighting for a party ticket?  As we have mentioned earlier, Aidt et al 
(2010) construct a theoretical model which assumes that tainted candidates have some electoral 
advantage which induces political parties to nominate them despite some reputational cost. They 
do not specify the nature of the electoral advantage, but mention in passing that it could be the 
power of criminal candidates to intimidate voters who are likely to vote for their rivals.  If this 
were the case, then one would expect voter turnout to be lower the greater is the number of 
tainted candidates. Table 12 negates this hypothesis – the data seem to show no negative 
relationship between voter turnout and the number of tainted candidates in a constituency. 
An alternative hypothesis advanced by Vaishnav (2010) is that tainted candidates are 
wealthier. In fact, he finds empirical support for this hypothesis in his data set which consists of 
elections in various State assemblies. As Table 13 shows, this seems to be true even in our 
sample. So, it seems plausible to argue that tainted candidates use their greater wealth to “buy” 
their tickets. They can use their wealth to campaign more intensively, and perhaps also 
contribute to party funds. Unfortunately, we have no data on campaign expenditure (other than 
the self-reported wealth of the candidates) to empirically verify any other hypothesis.
11
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4.  Conclusion  
Our main empirical results suggest that voters do punish candidates who have criminal 
charges against them. However, these tainted candidates are able to overcome this electoral 
disadvantage because they have greater wealth, and wealth plays a significant role in increasing 
vote shares. The most plausible channel through which wealth affects vote shares is of course 
through campaign expenditures, which are likely to be positively related to wealth. 
There is now a fair body of evidence suggesting that voters who have information about 
the corruption or non-performance of incumbent politicians do punish the latter.  For instance, 
Ferraz and Finan (2008) use detailed Brazilian electoral and audit data to show that new 
information about political corruption reduces the probability of re-election for corrupt 
incumbents. Bobonis et al (2011) find that publicly available pre-election municipal audits 
significantly reduce the level of corruption in Puerto Rican municipalities.
12
  Closer home, 
Banerjee et al (2011)  conclude, on the basis of a  field experiment conducted before the Delhi 
state  legislative elections, that voters who had access to information about incumbent 
performance  punished worse performing incumbents and those facing better qualified 
challengers – these incumbents then received  signiﬁcantly fewer votes.  
Our empirical results, along with this body of evidence,  suggests that it is important for 
voters to be better informed about candidate characteristics. The mere requirement that 
candidates file affidavits with the Election Commission about their characteristics is of limited 
use if voters do not have access to this information. Perhaps, the Election Commission needs to 
play a more active role in disseminating this information. The Commission must also think 
seriously about enhancing the   existing ceilings on campaign expenditure since practically no 
candidate or party adheres to the current limits on expenditure. However, the Commission must 
ensure that all candidates adhere to the enhanced (but realistic) ceiling.   This will then at least 
reduce the “wealth advantage” enjoyed by tainted politicians.  
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Appendix A1: Description and Data Sources of Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Dependent Variable Election Commission 
and own calculation 
The dependent variable for candidate i is calculated as 
   (
           
             
) 
Criminal Dummy Election Commission 
and Association for 
Democratic Reforms 
(ADR) 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate has two or more 
criminal cases against him, and zero otherwise. In robustness 
tests the dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate has three or 
more cases against him. 
Wealth*Criminal 
Dummy 
Election Commission Interaction variable calculated as Log wealth x dummy for 
criminal charges 
Relative wealth Election Commission 
and own calculation 
Wealth of the candidate/average wealth of all other candidates in 
the constituency 
Candidates with charges Election Commission 
and ADR 
Number of candidates within the constituency who face criminal 
cases. In most specifications, as mentioned in the tables, we look 
at the number of such candidates within top four candidates by 
vote share, and in robustness tests we include the number of all 
candidates with charges within the constituency.  
Candidates with 
charges*criminal 
dummy 
Election Commission 
and ADR and own 
construction 
Interaction between number of candidates with charges and 
criminal charges dummy. 
Education: Dummy for 
Undergraduate Degree 
Dummy for Masters 
Degree 
Election Commission Dummy for Undergraduate Degree takes a value 1 if a candidate 
has education up to undergraduate, and zero otherwise; and 
Dummy for Masters Degree takes a value 1 for education level 
higher than undergraduate (or for a technical or professional 
degree) and zero otherwise.  
Age Election Commission In years  
Gender dummy Election Commission Dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate is a female, and 0 
otherwise 
Incumbent Member of 
Parliament 
Various sources on the 
web 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate was a member of the 
previous Lok Sabha, and zero otherwise.  
State Incumbent party Various sources on the 
web and different 
issues of Economic 
and Political Weekly 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate belongs to a party 
which was in power in state government in 2008-09 before the 
Lok Sabha Elections. The state incumbent parties are: Andhra 
Pradesh, Indian National Congress (INC), TRS; Bihar: JDU, 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP); Chhattisgarh: BJP; Delhi: INC; 
Goa: INC, NCP; Gujarat: BJP; Himachal Pradesh: BJP; 
Haryana: INC; Kerala: CPI ( Marxist), CPI; Maharashtra: INC, 
NCP; Madhya Pradesh: BJP; Orissa: Biju Janata Dal; Punjab: 
Siromani Akali Dal, BJP; Rajasthan: BJP; Tamil Nadu: Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam, INC; Uttarakhand: BJP; Uttar Pradesh: 
Bajuhan Samaj Party; West Bengal: CPI (Marxist), RSP; 
Karnataka: BJP; Jharkhand: JMM, BJP 
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Appendix A2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Observations Average Minimum Maximum 
Per cent of Votes Obtained 7192 6.82 0.02 78.80 
   (
           
             
) 
7192 -4.61 -8.52 1.31 
Criminal dummy (at least two cases) 7173 0.07 0 1 
Number of candidates with charges (in 
top four candidates) 7192 1.22 0 4 
Relative wealth 7192 2.26 0.00 452.22 
Wealth (1000s) log 7192 13.81 0.69 22.57 
Education dummy for undergraduate 
degree 6749 0.22 0 1 
Education dummy for Masters degree 6749 0.27 0 1 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 7192 0.05 0 1 
State incumbency party 7192 0.07 0 1 
Age 7191 45.98 25 88 
Gender Dummy 7192 0.07 0 1 
*we drop three outliers from the regressions when the relative wealth exceeded 500. Statistics ate 
given for the data for twenty states that we have used in the paper. 
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Table 1: Candidates with Criminal Cases across Party Types 
Party Type  Number of 
Candidates 
Number of Candidates 
with least 2 Criminal 
Cases 
% of Candidates  
With at least 2 
Criminal Cases 
  I II III: (II/1)*100 
National Parties  1353 176 11.5 
State Parties  585 108 15.6 
Unrecognised Parties  1790 110 6.2 
Independent Candidates  3659 124 3.4 
    
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Contesting and Winning Candidates by the number of Criminal 
Cases 
Number of 
Criminal 
Cases 
Number of 
Candidates 
 
Number of 
Winning 
Candidates 
I II III 
0 6,551 349 
1 607 73 
2-4 382 57 
5-9 92 16 
>10 44 10 
Total 7676 506 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Candidates with Charges across Constituencies 
Number of candidates with at least two 
charges 
Number of constituencies 
0 206 
1 169 
2 83 
3 25 
4 14 
5 9 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1, data refers to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
 
 
 
Table 4: A Comparison of Variables for Candidates with and without Criminal Charges 
(at least two Criminal Charges) 
Criminal 
Dummy 
% votes Age Log Assets  
(in 1000s) 
Education 
Index 
Incumbent 
(percent) 
0 5.9 45.7 13.7 2.57 4 
1 15.4*** 47.2*** 15.1*** 2.71*** 10*** 
Total 6.59 45.8 13.81 2.58 5 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. *** indicates that the values are significantly 
different from those for candidates with one or no charges at 1 percent level of significance. 
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Table 5: Number of seats and Vote Shares of Parties 
  Parties Number of 
Seats 
Average 
Vote Share 
National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) 
Asom Gana Parishad 6 33.63 
  Bhartiya Janata Party 433 25.00 
  Indian National Lok Dal 5 28.99 
  Janata Dal (United) 55 18.53 
  Rashtriya Lok Dal 7 37.66 
  Shiromani Akali Dal 10 43.18 
  Shiv Sena 47 18.08 
  Telangana Rashtra Samiti 9 29.23 
United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) 
All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul 
Muslimeen 
1 42.14 
  All India Trinamool Congress 35 34.13 
  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 22 44.89 
  Indian National Congress 440 35.06 
  Jammu & Kashmir National 
Conference  
3 48.18 
  Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 42 5.62 
  Kerala Congress(M) 1 50.13 
  Muslim League Kerala State 
Committee 
17 9.30 
  Nationalist Congress Party 68 16.99 
  Republican Party of India 
(Athvale) 
53 0.40 
  Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch 3 29.28 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) 
Bahujan Samaj Party 500 7.18 
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Table 6: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates—Benchmark Specification 
(All Candidates, no Interaction Between Wealth and Criminal Dummy) 
 I II III IV V VI 
 All Drop 
INC 
Drop 
BJP 
Drop 
BSP 
Drop 
UPA 
Drop 
NDA 
Criminal Dummy  0.132 0.158 0.121 0.128 0.154 0.06 
 [1.21] [1.43] [1.07] [1.11] [1.35] [0.55] 
Candidates with Charges (among top 4) X 
criminal dummy 
0.278*** 0.284*** 0.306*** 0.287*** 0.270*** 0.316*** 
 [5.09] [4.95] [5.24] [4.92] [4.56] [5.54] 
Relative Wealth  0.008*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 
 [3.32] [5.04] [3.10] [2.87] [4.61] [3.16] 
Education dummy for undergrad degree 0.148*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.164*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
  [4.12] [3.69] [3.65] [4.42] [3.40] [3.30] 
Education dummy for masters degree 0.260*** 0.252*** 0.261*** 0.256*** 0.240*** 0.247*** 
 [7.27] [6.91] [7.07] [6.90] [6.52] [6.71] 
State Incumbent 1.772*** 2.072*** 1.926*** 1.599*** 1.976*** 1.812*** 
 [24.34] [24.57] [20.25] [18.74] [22.20] [18.59] 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 0.845*** 1.092*** 0.946*** 0.929*** 1.105*** 0.931*** 
 [9.69] [10.22] [8.87] [10.31] [9.82] [8.39] 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,729 6,338 6,341 6,281 6,145 6,213 
Adj. R-squared 0.782 0.757 0.763 0.79 0.752 0.762 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. 
The dependent variable is calculated as    (
           
             
)   In column I we estimate the regression for all the 
candidates. In column II -VI we drop candidates belonging to specific parties or coalition groups from the sample of 
all candidates. 
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Table 7: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates—Benchmark Specification  
(No independent Candidates, no Interaction Between Wealth and Criminal Dummy) 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
 All Drop 
INC 
Drop 
BJP 
Drop 
BSP 
Drop 
UPA 
Drop 
NDA 
Criminal Dummy  0.218 0.264* 0.226 0.208 0.222 0.15 
 [1.40] [1.66] [1.33] [1.17] [1.30] [0.90] 
Candidates with Charges (among top 4)  X 
criminal dummy 
0.229*** 0.213*** 0.266*** 0.244*** 0.203** 0.280*** 
 [3.10] [2.76] [3.23] [2.91] [2.45] [3.46] 
Relative Wealth  0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 [3.23] [3.74] [3.24] [3.15] [3.49] [3.42] 
Education dummy for undergrad degree 0.214*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.263*** 0.166*** 0.158** 
  [3.56] [3.01] [2.79] [3.96] [2.58] [2.38] 
Education dummy for masters degree 0.339*** 0.321*** 0.359*** 0.358*** 0.293*** 0.332*** 
 [6.02] [5.42] [5.77] [5.77] [4.80] [5.29] 
State Incumbent 1.741*** 2.008*** 1.860*** 1.654*** 1.905*** 1.748*** 
 [24.10] [23.21] [18.08] [18.70] [20.47] [16.69] 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 0.783*** 1.009*** 0.893*** 0.859*** 1.022*** 0.893*** 
 [8.89] [9.35] [8.15] [9.28] [8.96] [7.88] 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,629 3,238 3,241 3,181 3,045 3,113 
Adj. R-squared 0.773 0.767 0.76 0.787 0.769 0.764 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.   The dependent variable is calculated as 
   (
           
             
)   In column I we estimate the regression for all the candidates affiliated to some party, thus 
dropping Independent candidates. In subsequent columns,  we drop candidates belonging to specified parties or 
coalitions 
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Table 8: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates—Benchmark Specification  
(All Candidates) 
 I II III IV V VI 
 All Drop 
INC 
Drop 
BJP 
Drop 
BSP 
Drop 
UPA 
Drop 
NDA 
Criminal Dummy  -1.06*** -1.05*** -1.04*** -1.27*** -1.05*** -0.88** 
 (2.83) (2.83) (2.70) (3.30) (2.74) (2.30) 
Candidates with Charges (among top 4) 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 
X Criminal dummy  (4.48) (4.37) (4.71) (4.38) (4.03) (5.10) 
Relative Wealth  0.007*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 
 (3.02) (4.51) (2.81) (2.65) (4.11) (2.90) 
Wealth log X Criminal Dummy  0.082*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.096*** 0.084*** 0.066** 
 (3.19) (3.27) (3.01) (3.64) (3.16) (2.46) 
Education Dummy for Undergrad Degree 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.119*** 
 (4.03) (3.63) (3.55) (4.33) (3.35) (3.23) 
Education Dummy for Masters Degree 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.257*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.244*** 
 (7.16) (6.79) (6.95) (6.74) (6.42) (6.61) 
State Incumbent 1.76*** 2.054*** 1.910*** 1.599*** 1.961*** 1.798*** 
 (24.10) (24.18) (19.89) (18.75) (21.89) (18.28) 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 1.77*** 2.06*** 1.91*** 1.60*** 1.97*** 1.80*** 
 (24.15) (24.29) (19.99) (18.69) (21.99) (18.38) 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,729 6,338 6,341 6,281 6,145 6,213 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.76 0.764 0.79 0.75 0.76 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in equation 8 and the 
variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. The dependent variable is calculated as    (
           
             
)   In 
column I we estimate the regression for all the candidates. In column II -VI we drop candidates belonging to specific 
parties or coalition groups form the sample of non independent candidates. 
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Table 9: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates (Candidates who are affiliated with a 
Political Party)  
 I II III IV V VI 
 Party 
affiliated 
Drop 
INC 
Drop 
BJP 
Drop 
BSP 
Drop 
UPA 
Drop 
NDA 
Criminal Dummy  -0.97* -1.04** -0.85* -1.20** -1.18** -0.59 
 (1.93) (2.17) (1.65) (2.21) (2.21) (1.15) 
Candidates with Charges (among top 4) 0.198*** 0.17** 0.23*** 0.21** 0.160* 0.26*** 
X Criminal Dummy  (2.60) (2.18) (2.76) (2.48) (1.88) (3.06) 
Relative Wealth   0.009* 0.009** 0.012*** 0.009* 0.009** 
  (1.79) (2.41) (3.52) (1.65) (2.48) 
Wealth log X Criminal Dummy  0.079** 0.089*** 0.07** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.05 
 (2.37) (2.79) (2.13) (2.64) (2.71) (1.48) 
Education Dummy for Undergrad Degree 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.16** 0.15** 
 (2.76) (2.94) (2.70) (3.83) (2.49) (2.30) 
Education Dummy for Masters Degree 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 
 (4.37) (5.33) (5.70) (5.70) (4.69) (5.25) 
State Incumbent 1.74*** 2.0*** 1.87*** 1.64*** 1.91*** 1.76*** 
 (23.95) (23.05) (17.95) (18.53) (20.44) (16.60) 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 0.78*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 1.02*** 0.89*** 
 (8.88) (9.21) (8.08) (9.29) (8.87) (7.80) 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,629 3,227 3,231 3,172 3,037 3,103 
Adj. R-squared 0.774 0.766 0.76 0.787 0.768 0.763 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in equation 11 and the 
variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. The dependent variable is calculated as    (
           
             
)   In 
column I we estimate the regression for the candidates who are affiliated with a political party; so we drop all 
independent candidates from the sample. In subsequent columns, we drop candidates belonging to specified parties 
or coalitions. 
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Table 10: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates: Robustness Tests 
 I II III IV V 
Criminal Dummy    -1.27*** -0.98*** -1.02** 
   (3.30) (2.65) (2.53) 
Criminal Dummy (more than 2 cases) -1.15* -1.45**    
 (1.87) (2.15)    
Candidates with Charges (among top 4) X  0.28*** 0.195**    
Criminal Dummy (>2cases) (3.76) (2.03)    
Candidates with Charges (among top 4)   0.27*** 0.25***  
X Criminal Dummy    (4.84) (4.43)  
Candidates with Charges X Criminal 
Dummy  
    0.037 
     (1.22) 
Relative Wealth  0.008***  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (3.22)  (2.88) (3.00) (2.98) 
Relative Wealth (no independents)  0.008***    
  (2.69)    
Wealth log X Criminal Dummy    0.099*** 0.078*** 0.10*** 
   (3.71) (3.03) (3.95) 
Wealth log X Criminal Dummy (>2 cases) 0.089** 0.113***    
 (2.21) (2.63)    
Education Dummy for Undergrad Degree 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (4.17) (3.60) (4.02) (4.04) (4.01) 
Education Dummy for Masters Degree 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (7.25) (6.09) (7.10) (6.92) (7.10) 
State Incumbent 1.79*** 1.76*** 1.85*** 1.77*** 1.78*** 
 (24.37) (24.12) (24.06) (24.18) (24.31) 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 0.84*** 0.78*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.84*** 
 (9.59) (8.82) (9.57) (9.43) (9.56) 
State Incumbent*Criminal Dummy   -0.52***   
   (3.26)   
Age    0.005***  
    (3.78)  
Gender    0.036  
    (0.69)  
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,729 3,618 6,729 6,728 6,729 
Adj. R-squared 0.781 0.772 0.783 0.783 0.781 
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*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in equation 11 and the 
variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. The dependent variable is calculated as    (
           
             
)   In 
column I and II we include a new criminal charge dummy, which takes a value 1 only if the candidates face at least 
three charges. In column I we estimate the regression for all the candidates and in column II we estimate the 
regression after dropping independent candidates from the regression. In column III we include the interaction of 
state incumbent and criminal dummy. In column IV we include age and gender of the candidates in the regressions, 
and in column V, we include the interaction variable of all candidates with charges in the constituency and criminal 
dummy (rather than the candidates with charges among top four candidates interacted with criminal dummy).  
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Table 11: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates: More Robustness Tests 
 
 I II III 
 Different 
Reference group 
for relative 
wealth  
Only Reserved 
Constituencies 
Only General 
Constituencies 
Criminal Dummy  -1.08*** -1.79* -0.85** 
 (2.86) (1.87) (2.01) 
Candidates with charges (at least 3 % vote share) 0.08   
X Criminal Dummy (1.42)   
Candidates with charges (among top 4)   0.30* 0.25*** 
X Criminal Dummy  (1.91) (4.00) 
Relative Wealth (candidates with at least 3 % votes) 0.013***   
 (4.10)   
Relative Wealth   0 0.009*** 
  (0.15) (4.56) 
Wealth log X Criminal Dummy  0.109*** 0.140** 0.064** 
 (4.49) (1.97) (2.26) 
Education Dummy for Undergrad Degree 0.14*** 0.19** 0.11** 
 (3.98) (2.53) (2.54) 
Education Dummy for Masters Degree 0.26*** 0.39*** 0.21*** 
 (7.14) (4.83) (4.95) 
State Incumbent 1.79*** 1.71*** 1.76*** 
 (24.52) (11.30) (20.41) 
Incumbent Member of Parliament 0.82*** 0.66*** 0.88*** 
 (9.37) (3.24) (8.62) 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,715 2,021 4,708 
Adj. R-squared 0.781 0.764 0.787 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in equation 11 and the 
variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. The dependent variable is calculated as    (
           
             
)   In 
column I, relative wealth is calculated with respect to the wealth of the candidates who obtained at least 3 percent of 
the vote share. In column II we estimate the regression for only the candidates who contested elections from a 
constituency reserved for the candidates of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes; in column III we estimate the 
regression for the unreserved constituencies.  
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 Table 12: Voter Turnout and the Number of Candidates with Criminal Charges  
(Dependent Variable: Percent of Eligible Voters who voted) 
 I II III IV V VI 
Number of Candidates with at least two 
Charges 
0.079 0.34 0.23   0.20 
 (0.28) (1.21) (0.79)   (0.72) 
Total Candidates  -0.23*** -0.24***   -0.23*** 
  (4.14) (4.30)   (4.18) 
Number of Candidates with at least     0.861** 1.0**  
Two Charges from a Large Party    (2.08) (2.38)  
Number of Candidates from Large Parties     -0.579*  
     (1.86)  
Dummy for a Constituency Reserved    -2.25*** -1.25 -1.397* -2.23*** 
for the Scheduled Caste Candidates   (2.91) (1.65) (1.83) (2.85) 
Dummy for a Constituency Reserved    1.14 2.61** 2.74** 0.51 
for the Scheduled Tribe Candidates   (0.94) (2.24) (2.31) (0.41) 
Literacy      -0.093** 
      (2.09) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties No No No No No No 
Observations 506 506 506 506 506 506 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.788 0.792 0.784 0.785 0.794 
 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is percent of eligible voters who 
voted. Regressions are estimated using linear OLS regressions. A large party refers to a national or a state party. 
Literacy rate refers to the rate of literacy for each constituency in 2008, the data for which is obtained from Indicus 
Analytics.  
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Table 13: Candidate Wealth and Criminal Dummy 
(Dependent Variable: Candidate Wealth, Log) 
 
 
 I II III IV V 
Criminal Dummy  0.779*** 0.781*** 0.646*** 0.762*** 0.714*** 
 (7.57) (7.58) (6.27) (5.79) (6.06) 
Dummy for National Party 2.577*** 2.072***   1.924*** 
 (42.74) (31.15)   (22.36) 
Dummy for State Party 1.882*** 1.625***   1.426*** 
 (19.82) (17.55)   (13.21) 
Education Dummy for Undergrad Degree  0.744*** 0.648*** 0.656*** 0.701*** 
  (11.11) (9.79) (5.29) (7.37) 
Education Dummy for Masters Degree  1.041*** 0.820*** 1.020*** 1.021*** 
  (16.07) (12.51) (8.63) (11.88) 
Incumbent Member of Parliament   1.135*** 0.872*** 1.097*** 1.041*** 
  (11.64) (8.41) (10.54) (10.71) 
Fixed Effects for Constituencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects for Parties No No Yes No No 
Observations 7,173 6,733 6,729 2,075 3,629 
Adj. R-squared 0.253 0.305 0.372 0.208 0.29 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is log wealth of the candidates. 
Dummy for national party takes a value 1 if the candidate belongs to a national party, and zero otherwise; dummy 
for a state party takes a value 1 if the candidate belongs to a state party, and zero otherwise. In column IV we 
estimate regressions only for the candidates of national parties; and in column V regressions are estimated only for 
candidates who are affiliated with one of the political party, thus dropping the “Independent candidates”.  
